
Enterprise B2B growth depends on a clear GTM system: who to target, how to reach them, and how marketing and sales stay aligned across a long buying cycle. Origin needed that plan designed and implemented, covering both enterprise buyers and developers, without treating GTM as a one-off launch.
Without that system, activity tends to sprawl. A product announcement is mistaken for a motion. A developer event is mistaken for enterprise pipeline. Sales asks for leads while marketing is still arguing about positioning. Content is produced for whoever shouted last. None of that is unusual in B2B. It is also exactly what an annual plan is meant to prevent. The cost is not only wasted work. It is a year in which enterprise global customers and developers are spoken to as if they were the same person.
A long enterprise cycle needs marketing and sales to share a view of the buyer: which accounts, which problems, which proof, and what happens after first contact. If those things are not written down, sales improvises in the room and marketing improvises in the channels. The two improvisations rarely match. Developers need a different cadence entirely: clearer product narrative, channels they actually use, and a path that does not feel like a procurement process. If those journeys are not named and resourced, developer work gets squeezed in around the enterprise calendar, or enterprise work is diluted into developer-shaped content that cannot survive a commercial evaluation.
The other cost is internal. When GTM is treated as a launch, marketing is busy before the date and unclear after it. Sales does not know what is coming next. The following quarter is a negotiation rather than an operating rhythm. Origin needed to replace that pattern with a framework that could run year-round for both audiences, with a planning cadence that made the year visible in quarters rather than as a mural of good intentions.
Ideal customer definition is where most B2B GTM work quietly fails. If the ICP is a compromise between enterprise and developer, the plan will keep producing compromise work. Origin needed the opposite: two ICPs, two motions, one commercial ambition. Sales and marketing then had to align on what each motion was for. Enterprise work is not a lead-volume game in the same way a developer motion can look like one. Developer work is not a late-stage commercial conversation. Mixing the two in the same funnel, the same content calendar, and the same definition of success is how both motions stall.
Alignment is not a meeting. It is a shared annual plan, a shared language for the two buyers, and a cadence for reviewing whether the plan is still the plan. Origin did not have that operating rhythm in a form both teams could run. The brief was therefore structural. Design the plan. Implement it. Make it annual, so the business was not dependent on a single launch window. Attract enterprise global customers and developers with a framework the company could keep using after the first quarter of work was done.
The challenge, stated plainly, was the absence of a GTM system that sales and marketing could execute together: no durable annual planning cadence, no clean split between developer and enterprise motions, and no operating rhythm that would survive the week after launch.
Origin needed a marketing partner who could attract enterprise global customers and developers. The brief was not a launch week, a product announcement, or a burst of demand generation. It was an annual go-to-market plan that sales and marketing could execute against, review together, and run again the following year without starting from a blank page.
That distinction matters in B2B. A campaign has a start date, a creative idea, and a wrap-up. A GTM plan has an operating cadence: who is in market this quarter, which narrative sales can take into a long enterprise cycle, how developers are treated as a motion of their own, and what both teams do when the first burst of activity is over. Origin did not need more activity for its own sake. It needed a system both teams could point to when deciding what to do next.
Enterprise buyers and developers do not move through the same journey. An enterprise customer evaluates risk, commercial terms, integration, security, and whether a vendor will still be there after procurement. The room often includes technical and non-technical stakeholders. The cycle is long. The language of the sale is commercial as much as it is product. A developer evaluates whether the product is clear, credible, and worth their time. They do not want a sales trap. They want a product story they can test, a path they can enter without a form gauntlet, and proof that the company understands how they actually work.
Origin needed both audiences in the plan. Treating them as one funnel would have produced content neither group trusted: too sales-heavy for developers, too product-led and informal for an enterprise evaluation. The ideal customer profile therefore had to be written as two related ICPs, not a single blended persona. Enterprise global customers sat in one motion. Developers sat in another. They could share a commercial ambition without sharing a journey, a channel mix, or a definition of a qualified conversation.
Segments was brought in to design that dual motion and then implement it, so the plan did not sit in a slide deck. The work had to leave Origin with a growth plan sales and marketing could actually run. The partnership was scoped as design plus implementation, not a strategy document handed over at the end of a workshop.
Origin already knew who it wanted to serve. Enterprise global customers and developers were not a late discovery. What was missing was the annual marketing system that would attract both, on a cadence the commercial team could live with. Positioning, channel planning, sales and marketing alignment, and the weekly and quarterly rhythm of a GTM plan are not things a product team invents between releases. They have to be designed, written down, resourced, and run.
The customer in this engagement is therefore Origin as a commercial organisation, not Origin as a product. The job was to give that organisation an annual GTM plan it could operate: named audiences, a shared narrative, a way for sales and marketing to stay aligned across a long buying cycle, and an operating rhythm that survived the first quarter of work.
Segments developed and launched Origin's B2B enterprise growth plan. Annual marketing GTM plans are now in place to attract enterprise global customers and developers. That is the result of this engagement, and it is stated without a percentage because the commercial outcome here is the system itself: a plan sales and marketing can execute year-round.
Success was measured by whether the plan existed, whether it covered both enterprise customers and developers, and whether it had been implemented rather than left as a slide deck. The test is operational. Can marketing and sales point to the same annual GTM plan? Are the two buyer journeys distinguished? Is there a cadence for running the work after launch? Those are the questions a GTM engagement should be able to answer. Origin can answer them because the plan was designed and then put to work.
The qualitative read is the one that matters here. Origin did not ask for a performance percentage. It asked for a growth plan. The plan is the result. Implementation is the proof. The B2B enterprise growth plan being launched, rather than parked, is what turns a piece of strategy work into a commercial operating system.
Commercially, Origin no longer had to treat GTM as a one-off. The company had a growth plan designed for the way enterprise deals and developer adoption actually move, and it had been put into market rather than parked in a strategy folder. Sales had a narrative and a cadence to work against. Marketing had a year-round framework instead of a launch calendar. Developer and enterprise motions were named, resourced, and held in the same annual view. That is the commercial meaning of a GTM plan that was both designed and implemented.
The operating rhythm is the part that lasts. An annual plan that sales and marketing can still point to in the third quarter is worth more than a launch that looked busy in the first. Origin now has that rhythm: a way to attract enterprise global customers and developers without rebuilding the system every time a new quarter starts. The engagement leaves the business with a GTM plan it can run, review, and run again.
What remains is not a campaign archive. It is an annual marketing GTM system with two ICPs, a sales and marketing alignment cadence, parallel motions for developers and enterprise buyers, and an operating rhythm that was implemented rather than described. That is the work Segments was hired to do. That is the work that was delivered. The B2B enterprise growth plan is in market. The annual plan is the document both teams use. The year can be run in quarters, with both audiences visible, and without treating GTM as a launch that ends when the creative does.
For a B2B company that needs to attract enterprise global customers and developers, that is the result that matters: a plan the business can keep using after the first quarter of work is done.
Segments designed and implemented annual marketing GTM plans for Origin. The work covered positioning, channel planning, and the operating cadence required to attract enterprise global customers and developers, and to give the business a framework it could run year-round. Design without implementation would have left Origin with a deck. Implementation without design would have left Origin with more activity. The engagement was both, on purpose.
The work opened with discovery: how Origin sold today, where enterprise conversations stalled, how developers currently found the product, and what sales needed from marketing in a long cycle. Discovery was not a research theatre. It was the input to an annual plan. From there the plan was designed as a system rather than a calendar of tactics. Positioning was locked so enterprise buyers and developers were not being spoken to with the same message. Channel planning followed the buyer, not the other way around. The operating cadence turned the plan into a weekly and quarterly rhythm sales and marketing could share.
Implementation sat beside design. A GTM document that never reaches the channels, the site, the sales narrative, or the reporting cadence is not a growth plan. Segments stayed through the build so Origin did not have to translate a strategy deck into work on its own. The B2B enterprise growth plan was developed as the commercial expression of that annual GTM system, then launched so it existed in market rather than in a folder.
Ideal customer work was written so sales could use it. For enterprise global customers, that meant a view of who is in the room, what they are evaluating, how long the cycle tends to run, and which proof belongs in a commercial conversation. For developers, that meant a view of how they find a product, what they need to see before they invest time, and which channels they actually use. Those two ICPs then drove content, channel choices, and how the year was planned. If a piece of work could not be mapped to either the enterprise customer or the developer, it did not belong in the annual plan.
That split is the opposite of a blended persona. It is also the only way a dual motion stays honest. Enterprise work was allowed to look like enterprise work: slower, more commercial, more dependent on sales and marketing staying aligned. Developer work was allowed to look like developer work: more product-led, more useful, less extractive. The annual plan held both without forcing them through one funnel.
Alignment was designed as an operating rhythm, not a kick-off. Sales and marketing needed the same language for the two buyers, the same view of what was in market this quarter, and a way to review the plan without throwing the year away. That is what an annual GTM plan is for. Marketing could not disappear into campaigns sales had not asked for. Sales could not ask for one-off assets that sat outside the plan. The cadence made both behaviours visible: weekly enough to stay useful, quarterly enough to protect the year.
In practice that meant named workstreams for each motion, a shared view of the narrative sales would take into enterprise conversations, and a developer motion that was resourced as a motion rather than as leftover capacity. Review was part of the design. An annual plan that cannot be adjusted is a mural. An annual plan that is adjusted every week is not a plan. Origin needed the middle: a year that could be run in quarters, with a rhythm for deciding what not to do.
Channel planning was the practical layer: where each audience would be reached, what marketing would produce, and how sales would pick up the thread. The point was not to be everywhere. It was to stop Origin from running disconnected bursts and to replace them with a year-round sequence that could be resourced. Enterprise work and developer work were planned as parallel motions, so one did not cannibalise the other's calendar. The annual shape of the plan mattered. A year is long enough for an enterprise cycle to move, and short enough that the plan has to be specific.
Segments built it to be used in quarters, not admired as a full-year artefact. Named workstreams, a rhythm for reviewing them, and a way to decide what not to do kept both motions visible in the same operating view. Developer versus enterprise was not a branding exercise. It was a resource decision, a content decision, and a sales-enablement decision, written into the same annual plan.
The operating cadence is what makes an annual GTM plan real. It sets what is in market this quarter, how marketing and sales review the same language, and how the plan is adjusted without discarding the year. Origin needed that cadence designed and then implemented, so the growth plan was something the business ran, not something it launched once. Weekly and quarterly rhythms sat on top of the annual plan. Enterprise conversations and developer work could be seen in the same operating view without being forced into the same definition of progress.
Operationally, Origin moved from needing marketing support to a GTM system with named audiences, a shared plan, and a rhythm for executing it. Sales and marketing had a framework for attracting enterprise global customers and developers rather than a queue of one-off requests. The annual plan became the document both teams could point to when deciding what to do next. That is the work that lets a B2B company keep going after the launch week ends.
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